Makhno writes:

Fetishizing Process

Mark Lance

If one were forced to explain consensus process in five minutes, one might begin with a

brief pitch about the kind of discussion that should precede the group taking a decision.

Such a pitch would be fairly vague, and would deal with such things as listening, including

all points of view, critical discussion and argument, and creativity in the formulation of

possible compromises and syntheses. But one would quickly switch from the topic of

discussion to the specific procedure that is used to take a formal decision. Here the

account is not at all vague, as precise as any sort of voting procedure. One would explain

how a position is proposed, how people have the choice of supporting, standing aside, or

blocking, how a position can only be adopted by the group if no one blocks, etc. (It is

likely, and relevant, that the majority of people who have been part of decision making

under the banner of "consensus process" have little more than such a five minute

understanding of what is involved.)

If one had much more than five minutes to explain consensus process, one would say little

more about the formal procedure for taking decisions. This part really can be defined in a

few minutes. One would, however, go into far more detail on the complex, less precise, more

deeply contextual business that precedes actually taking a decision. That is, one would

focus on the process of discussion, option formulation, argument, etc.

In what follows, let us call the complex process of discussion — a process about which much

can be said, but the proper functioning of which is unlikely to be definable via a set of

precise rules — "practice". The set of formal rules that define a method of taking a

decision will be referred to as "procedure". This distinction, in itself, is nothing

surprising or new, but I want to argue that it is of great import to the debate between

majority voting and consensus. Such debates are central to anarchist theory as they concern

the form and content of democratic inclusion. Indeed, if anything is essential to

anarchism, it is the idea that social decisions are to be taken by everyone affected, and

that this inclusion must involve substantive participation of each in deliberation and

decsion-making. Thus a dispute on the nature of such participation is a dispute about the

very essence of anarchism.

But I argue that the debate between voting and consensus is deeply flawed. First, many

advocates on each side run together procedure and practice in a pernicious way - criticizing

procedures of the other side, while defending not their own procedure, but rather their

conception of practice. Second, it turns out that the right answer to how we ought to

structure ourselves - around a norm of consensus or a norm of majority rule - depends

crucially on whether we are talking about procedure or practice. In short, and rather

misleadingly, procedures should be closer to majority rule, but only in the service of a

practice which is geared around a deep commitment to consensus. In arguing for this second

point, I show that consensus procedure is actually deeply unsuited to radical

organizations. But at the same time, I begin to make the case that a focus on procedure

itself is ultimately the real problem, which brings us to the third and most important

point. An anti-authoritarian democratic organization must not understand itself as defined

by a set of formal procedures. Rules can be used, as tools of a virtuous community with a

largely functional practice, but they should be no more than tools.

Understanding the goal of democratic community to involve a search for the right set of

formal rules that we can then blindly follow with no further obligation to their proper and

just implementation is no better than understanding it as a search for the best and most

just king. Making a fetish of a process - worshiping a way of doing things - can be every

bit as oppressive as making a fetish of personal authority.

§1: More heat than light

One might expect discussions of decision-making process by anarchists to be among the most

intellectually sophisticated, civil, and collaborative of debates in political philosophy.

After all, the idea that people can, without authoritarian or hierarchical oversight, reach

just decisions among themselves in a way that expresses and at the same time nurtures the

autonomy of the individual is central to anarchism. So surely, at least in their internal

discussions of how to achieve these goals in existing organizations, anarchists would strive

to exhibit the sorts of collaborative process they advocate for society at large.

On the other hand, there is the real world.

Though there exist careful and respectful contributions to the anarchist debate on group

process, one finds a great deal more by way of caricature, denouncement, and table-pounding.

Advocates of consensus, for example, try to associate voting with coercion, unthinking

mechanism, rigidity of thought, and an endorsement of liberal representationalism.



Consensus means making decisions by the united consent of all. It is noncoercive, as it

avoids imposing anyone's will on others.... Consensus is really more natural than majority

vote.... In consensus, the group encourages the sharing of all viewpoints held by those

with interest in a topic. These viewpoints are then discussed in a spirit of respect and

mutual accommodation. New ideas arise and viewpoints are synthesized, until a formula

emerges that wins general approval.... Consensus is "organic"-unlike mechanical

voting."1

Consensus is a decision-making process that reflects commitment to the right of every person

to influence decisions that affect them....Consensus is a creative process. It is a process

for synthesizing the ideas and concerns of all group members. Unlike voting, it is not an

adversary, win/lose method. With consensus, we do not have to choose between two

alternatives. Instead we can create a third, a fourth or more as we see that problems may

have many possible solutions. Those who hold views different from ours do not become

opponents; instead, their views can be seen as giving us a fresh and valuable perspective.

As we work to meet their concerns, our proposals may be strengthened. When we use consensus,

we encourage each person's active participation, and we listen carefully to what each person

says."2

Or finally: "Voting is a process in which people express their preferences - whether

strongly heartfelt or weakly ephemeral. Voters are usually forced to choose between two

proposals - ostensibly opposite, but often both unacceptable: "would you rather be poked in

the eye with a stick or hit on the head with a rock?" The decision is reached by

simplistically adding up these preferences. [Voting] often encourages cagey

manipulation."3

"Those who hold views different from ours do not become opponents; instead, their views can

be seen as giving us a fresh and valuable perspective,"... unless they advocate voting. If

they advocate voting, it seems, there are few limits to the caricatures and red herrings we

can utilize. Why, if we advocate voting, can we not be respectful of and learn from

different views? Why must we consider only two proposals? Why must we coerce people, or

ignore their right to influence decisions that affect them?

But those who oppose the current trend towards consensus in anarchist circles are, if

anything, worse:

The only collective alternative to majority voting as a means of decision-making that is

commonly presented is the practice of consensus. Indeed, consensus has even been mystified

by avowed "anarcho-primitivists," who consider Ice Age and contemporary "primitive" or

"primal" peoples to constitute the apogee of human social and psychic attainment. I do not

deny that consensus may be an appropriate form of decision-making in small groups of people

who are thoroughly familiar with one another. But to examine consensus in practical terms,

my own experience has shown me that when larger groups try to make decisions by consensus,

it usually obliges them to arrive at the lowest common intellectual denominator in their

decision-making: the least controversial or even the most mediocre decision that a sizable

assembly of people can attain is adopted -- precisely because everyone must agree with it or

else withdraw from voting on that issue. More disturbingly, I have found that it permits an

insidious authoritarianism and gross manipulations -- even when used in the name of autonomy

or freedom.

I can personally attest to the fact that within the Clamshell Alliance, consensus was

fostered by often cynical Quakers and by members of a dubiously "anarchic" commune that was

located in Montague, Massachusetts.... In order for that clique to create full consensus

on a decision, minority dissenters were often subtly urged or psychologically coerced to

decline to vote on a troubling issue, inasmuch as their dissent would essentially amount to

a one-person veto.... Having withdrawn, they ceased to be political beings -- so that a

"decision" could be made.... On a more theoretical level, consensus silenced that most

vital aspect of all dialogue, dissensus. The ongoing dissent, the passionate dialogue that

still persists even after a minority accedes temporarily to a majority decision, was

replaced in the Clamshell by dull monologues -- and the uncontroverted and deadening tone of

consensus. In majority decision-making, the defeated minority can resolve to overturn a

decision on which they have been defeated -- they are free to openly and persistently

articulate reasoned and potentially persuasive disagreements. Consensus, for its part,

honors no minorities, but mutes them in favor of the metaphysical "one" of the "consensus"

group.

The creative role of dissent, valuable as an ongoing democratic phenomenon, tends to fade

away in the gray uniformity required by consensus. Any libertarian body of ideas that seeks

to dissolve hierarchy, classes, domination and exploitation by allowing even Marshall's

"minority of one" to block decision-making by the majority of a community, indeed, of

regional and nationwide confederations, would essentially mutate into a Rousseauean "general

will" with a nightmare world of intellectual and psychic conformity. 4

[Murray Bookchin]

(Don't we all feel empowered to dissent from Murray's position?)

Dissent must therefore be encouraged, not discouraged. Only through a principled

discussion of what is at stake in an issue can the truth be clarified. It is liberals--those

who accept the system--who water down and obscure truths to platitudes with which everyone

can agree and who seek consensus in the form of "peace." In an age of accommodation like

ours--as in all ages--it is liberals who would deny the importance of clarifying radical

truths.

Majority rule is the democratic method of determining the will of the large group in

decision-making. For majority rule protects the minority's right to dissent, and majority

rule exempts them from the obligation to carry out a group decision with which they

disagree. In order for diversity of opinion to be valued, therefore, majority rule in large

groups must be viewed as an acceptable process.

[Janet Biehl]

It is indicative, I suppose, of the depth of feeling on this issue that these serious

thinkers and activists could engage in such a breath-takingly irrational string of

caricatures. For present purposes, I want to focus on one aspect of the caricature: that

each side in this debate characterizes the other as defending a formal procedure,

which is then held to a very high standard: essentially, to be foolproof. That is, if we

can imagine, or cite actual instances of, behavior consistent with the procedure which

violate core values or otherwise give rise to practices of deliberation we don't approve of,

this is grounds for rejecting the procedure. On the other hand, each side defines

itself, not in terms of the formal procedure, but rather the procedure together with

a vaguely stated collection of good practices, just institutions, and virtuous

agents.

Bookchin and Biehl, for example, define consensus as the procedure in which decisions are

only adopted after universal assent (perhaps with stand-asides) and in which one person can

block action. Then, Bookchin gives us an example of a group - the Clamshell Alliance - that

abused this procedure by pressuring others into accepting the consensus.5 (One

hardly need speak here of his transparent guilt-by-association ploy of mentioning

primitivists.) Biehl and Bookchin both conclude from examples like this that consensus in

general denies the existence of minorities, bullies them into conforming, waters down

radical truths, even leads to "a nightmare world of intellectual and psychic

conformity!"6

Many advocates of consensus, similarly, define "majority rule" in terms of the procedure of

voting on two pre-selected choices. They assume that people come to these choices and vote

their antecedent inclinations ("whether strongly heartfelt or weakly ephemeral"), that such

decisions are not "discussed in a spirit of respect and mutual accommodation," that no

effort is made to reformulate options, or to come up with others, that those with differing

views are treated as "opponents," and that manipulation is likely to be engaged in.

That is, in both cases what is criticized is the practice of concrete, far from ideal

groups who utilize the procedure in dispute. Certainly there is no essential reason

why dividing opposing votes into blocks and stand-asides must lead to a suppression of

dissent. Indeed, as a simple matter of logic, consensus assigns greater, indeed

dictatorial, power to minorities. The mere fact that we are going to vote is obviously no

guarantee that some nefarious majority won't try to pressure minorities into accepting their

position on the grounds that a unanimous vote shows strength, solidarity, etc. So it is

really completely obvious that the Bookchin/Biehl worries have nothing to do with the choice

of which procedure one employs.

Nor, however, is there any reason why a commitment to majority rule requires lack of

discussion, limiting options to two, or treating people as opponents. A group can engage in

any sort of fair-minded, inclusive, open-ended discussion it likes, reformulating positions,

trying out options to see if there is unanimity, learning from dissent, etc., all ending up

in a majority vote on the proposal that seems to have most support in the discussion. Thus

the advocates of consensus quoted above are no more focusing on essential features of groups

that use voting than are Bookhin and Biehl focusing on essential features of consensus

groups.

If there is an intelligible claim being made in either argument, it can only be that the

pernicious sort of behavior in question is more likely in fact to follow from the use of the

procedure being attacked. But neither side - nor any other literature that I'm aware of -

makes any serious attempt to argue that one procedure is more likely than the other to be

abused in this way. Presumably, such an argument would require concrete statistical

evidence, and I'm skeptical that any significant generalizations are forthcoming. In my own

rather extensive experience with activist groups, I've seen both procedures used well, and

both abused, with about equal frequency.

By contrast, note how each group discusses its own approach: "In consensus, the group

encourages the sharing of all viewpoints held by those with interest in a topic. These

viewpoints are then discussed in a spirit of respect and mutual accommodation. New ideas

arise and viewpoints are synthesized, until a formula emerges that wins general approval."

Or for a more expansive account:

So what would an alternative revolutionary decision making process look like, you ask? To

begin with, a fundamental shift from competition to cooperation.... Cooperation is more

than "live and let live". It is making an effort to understand another's point of view. It

is incorporating another's perspective with your own so that a new perspective emerges. It

is suspending disbelief, even if only temporarily, so you can see the gem of truth in ideas

other than your own. It is a process of creativity, synthesis, and open-mindedness that

leads to trust-building, better communication and understanding, and ultimately, a stronger,

healthier, more successful group.... The last and most visible step towards revolutionary

change in group process is the manner in which members of the group interact with each

other. Dominating attitudes and controlling behavior would not be tolerated. People would

show respect and expect to be shown respect. Everyone would be doing their personal best to

help the group reach decisions which are in the best interest of the group. There would be

no posturing and taking sides. Conflicts would be seen as an opportunity for growth,

expanding people's thinking, sharing new information, and developing new solutions which

include everyone's perspectives. The group would create an environment where everyone was

encouraged to participate, conflict was freely expressed, and resolutions were in the best

interest of everyone involved.7

[C.T. Lawrence Butler]

It is interesting that when allowed to speak for themselves, the advocates of voting espouse

similar practices. Here is Bookchin again:

Even so knowledgeable a historian of anarchism as Peter Marshall observes that, for

anarchists, "the majority has no more right to dictate to the minority, even a minority of

one, than the minority to the majority." Scores of libertarians have echoed this idea time

and again.

What is striking about assertions like Marshall's is their highly pejorative language.

Majorities, it would seem, neither "decide" nor "debate": rather, they "rule," "dictate,"

"command," "coerce" and the like. In a free society that not only permitted, but fostered

the fullest degree of dissent, whose podiums at assemblies and whose media were open to the

fullest expression of all views, whose institutions were truly forums for discussion -- one

may reasonably ask whether such a society would actually "dictate" to anyone when it had to

arrive at a decision that concerned the public welfare.[Ibid]

A purer case of talking (yelling) past one another could hardly be constructed. What emerges

is that there are two fundamentally distinct dimensions of assessment going on, which we may

call "procedural" and "practical". Procedural assessment looks to the formal rules that are

explicitly adopted by the group as governing decision-making process. Practical assessment

looks to the practices of the group, and the underlying habits, psychologies, traditions,

and context that support the continuation of those practices. What is striking about the

debate between consensus and majority rule, then, is that each side defines the other

exclusively in terms of a procedure, while defining themselves first and foremost in terms

of practice.

To engage in "direct democracy" as Bookchin defines the term requires that one vote only

after a full discussion. Direct democracy is, by definition, a procedure employed by a

"free society that not only permit[s], but foster[s] the fullest degree of dissent, whose

podiums at assemblies and whose media [are] open to the fullest expression of all views,

whose institutions [are] truly forums for discussion." That Bookchin intends this to be a

definitional truth can be seen from the fact that he never so much as considers other uses

of voting to be relevant to the system he is endorsing. Similarly, advocates of consensus

process define consensus as a procedure that is used by a respectful community of serious

dialogue, a group which functions as a forum for fair discussion. Ask any consensus

advocate how they can endorse giving one difficult person the ability to veto every decision

unless we adopt his view and she will tell you that such a thing is not consensus process at

all.

Now in neither case are we simply asked to ignore the possibility of procedural abuse.

Advocates of consensus typically describe in some detail the sorts of attitudes that are

necessary in order for participants to function in the way they should, and in some cases,

explain the kinds of discipline, training, facilitation, and practice that are needed for

people to carry this off. Bookchin, similarly, has written about the kinds of institutions

that a society needs, and the sorts of attitudes and work that people will need to bring to

those institutions, in order for society to function well in genuinely democratic forums.

But this merely highlights my point: the practice of the participants, their skills, habits,

relations, and virtues - along with the broader societal structures and institutions that

engender and support these - are where the action is.

§2: Two case studies

In this section we look at two decision-making institutions. One is a self-identified

radical organization devoted to an ideology of inclusiveness and diversity, with the goal of

liberatory social change, and operating by consensus. The second is a mainstream

institution - an academic department - with no commitment to a radical agenda, operating

officially by a formal voting mechanism. My point will not be to suggest that voting leads

to better behavior than does consensus, but rather to highlight some aspects of respectful

practice, and to indicate just how little formal procedure has to do with the quality of

human interaction that goes on.

The first case involved the Mobilization for Global Justice (MGJ), the largest coalition of

the Global Justice Movement to arise out of the uprising in Seattle in 1999.8 In

Summer and Fall 2001, MGJ was planning for a convergence and demonstration around the annual

meetings of the IMF and WB in Washington DC. A wide range of education, legal protest, and

civil disobedience had been planned, generally in accord with the way these things had been

going on for the past couple years. MGJ in DC was a large, diverse, and vibrant group,

albeit one which in retrospect had two significantly different sorts of members. On the one

hand, a wide range of grassroots protest, activist, or direct action groups were a part of

MGJ. On the other, a number of formal NGOs with paid staff took part.

The attacks against civilians in New York and Washington, DC on Sept. 11, 2001 caused

something of a crisis throughout the progressive community. Clearly this was an event that

had deeply affected the American public and nearly everyone realized that it changed the

political context in ways that called for a re-thinking of strategies and tactics. Going

into a crucial meeting following the attacks, nearly every member group in MGJ would have

supported scaling back the level of confrontation with police, many supported eliminating

civil disobedience altogether actions, and a handful of NGOs favored completely canceling

the protests.

Representatives of this latter group arranged to be in the position of facilitator on the

day in question. After a bit of unfocussed discussion, a proposal was put on the board.

"The MGJ will go ahead with its plans for protests during the meetings of the financial

institutions" (or something very much like that). Immediately, representatives of the

group in favor of canceling the event announced that they were blocking this proposal.

Objections, arguments, discussion, etc. were met with stony rejection. The proposal was

blocked, and the events were cancelled. It was estimated by those present that roughly 80%

of the people in attendance opposed canceling things. But they had no real say. There was

no real discussion or response to the arguments the majority made, merely condescending

lectures on being responsible protestors, and stony refusal to consider the

block.9

Let us contrast with this case, the general practice of a quite different organization, one

that is not in any way explicitly radical, but rather an academic department: the department

of philosophy at Georgetown University. For the last 15 years or so, this department, in

its internal deliberations, has been a veritable model of civility, rationality, and

respect. It is a large department, as such things go, with around 24 members. It is

ideologically, philosophically, and methodologically highly diverse including analytic and

continental philosophers, conservatives, liberals, socialists, capitalist libertarians, and

(one) anarchist, committed Catholics, and atheists.10 Nonetheless, in almost

every case, members of the department genuinely respect one another and, in the few

counter-instances, nonetheless recognize the importance of treating their colleagues with

respect and civility. Discussions are always open, intellectually sophisticated, and

creative. Everyone in the department participates in discussions. Graduate student

representatives to department meetings, and really any other graduate student with strong

views on the matter, participate fully and openly. New members quickly learn that one does

not try to score points, put down colleagues, ignore the arguments people are making, or,

for that matter, blindly endorse anyone else's opinion. That just isn't the way things are

done in our department.

Procedurally the Georgetown philosophy department works by a version of majority rule,

officially following Roberts' Rules in discussion, majority vote when there are two options,

and a complicated variant of majority rule when there are more options. In reality, no one

in the department knows much about Roberts' Rules, and voting is usually a rather pointless

afterthought. In the first decade of my participation, only a handful of votes ended other

than unanimously, for the simple reason that discussion almost always led to a position that

struck everyone as the rational one. And of the few cases in which there has been a vote,

most have been overwhelmingly in one direction, with those who disagreed fully accepting the

majority decision.

It is clear enough that the problem with what went on at MGJ wasn't primarily due to the use

of consensus procedure. Had majority vote been the procedure, the NGOs could, for example,

have engaged in a mass mobilization of members. (Part of the problem that day was that

things were rushed, and these groups by way of their paid staff and better communication

networks were able to prepare for the meeting much more quickly.) If they had done so, and

turned out 51% of the people at the meeting, they could still have controlled the outcome,

in roughly the same manner. Indeed, for all Bookchin's (correct) insistence that majority

rule need not involve a tyranny of the majority, dictates or commands, it is perfectly clear

that it can involve such things. There is certainly nothing in the procedural rules of

voting that prevents this. (Think how many states are now passing patently heterosexist

laws. Though these are usually the result of legislators rather than popular votes, there

is little doubt that popular votes would turn out the same way in most cases. Such majority

support hardly renders these laws less repellent, or the arguments behind them less

vapid.)

Thus, whatever virtues the GU philosophy department instantiates are also independent of its

commitment to voting procedures. At least as far back as Plato's Republic, it has been

noted that when the procedure is majority vote, it is possible to mobilize the mob through

graft, rhetoric, fear, or other irrational means, so as to force decisions on the minority

that are neither wise nor just. Clearly, as Plato is at pains to emphasize, there is no

essential connection between what the majority believes and what is right and just. (Of

course there is also no such connnection between what everyone believes and what is right

and just. If we all agree, perhaps it is simply because we share our ignorance, predjudice,

or bigotry.)

§3: why consensus procedure is inherently conservative.

Defenders of consensus procedure often suggest that the MGJ case arose because of a

violation of that procedure. Some suggest that consensus procedure properly includes a rule

against re-opening questions unless there is a consensus to do so. Others suggest that

there was a problem in the formulation of the proposal, or the structure of the debate.

This is all fair, but I think it misses the main point. I want to claim that any

formal procedure can be abused. But in this section, I focus on consensus procedure, and

offer a quite general abstract argument against it.11

While consensus decision-making is typically put forward as a radical alternative to voting,

or at least as more suited to radical or revolutionary projects, it turns out that consensus

rules are deeply conservative in their very structure. Recall that, according to consensus

procedure, a proposal is formulated, and then it must receive unanimous support - ignoring

stand-asides - to be adopted by the group. That is, if one person opposes it, the group

cannot adopt it. The first problem with this procedure is that it doesn't prescribe a

procedure based on the content or meaning of a proposal, but rather based on arbitrary

features of its formulation. Suppose, for example, that a group is faced with a situation

in which they would normally engage in some sort of protest action. Perhaps they are an

anti-war group, and the US has just launched an invasion. Say for purposes of argument that

all but one of the people thinks that a protest should be held, but one strongly opposes

this for whatever reason. Here are two ways to formulate the disagreement.

Formulation 1:

Group A endorses protesting the invasion.

Group B (one person) opposes protesting the invasion.

Formulation 2:

Group B (one person) endorses remaining quiet about the invasion (doing nothing)

Group A opposes remaining quiet about the invasion.
The difference between these formulations comes to nothing under a majority voting

procedure, but is absolutely crucial under consensus. If the proposal is "Let us hold a

protest" then the one person opposing can block and nothing happens. But if the proposal is

to do nothing, then any one of the many who support protesting can block, thereby forcing a

protest.

Now in a case like this, it is probably natural to think that formulation 1 is the right

one. What we need consensus for is to do things, and if we cannot reach consensus on

what to do, the group will do nothing. But even if this distinction between action and

inaction makes sense in all cases, it is not one that radical groups should be happy

assigning such significance to. Isn't it a staple of our analysis that inaction is a form

of action? When one goes about one's life and ignores political, economic, cultural

disputes, don't we consistently argue that one is thereby supporting the status quo, playing

a concrete role in keeping the system functioning? Sitting on one's ass may be the right

thing to do in a given situation, but we radicals always insist that it is nonetheless

doing something, something that calls just as much for justification as anything

else.

How strange, then, to endorse a decision-making process that essentially privileges doing

nothing over doing something, for that is exactly what consensus procedure is, on the

current understanding. If we insist that the formulation of a proposal must be in the

positive - a proposal to do something rather than to remain inactive - then we are

legislating that one strongly held opinion can prevent action, while all-but-one's equally

strongly held opinion is still insufficient to force action. Thus, if the earlier argument

about the role of inaction in an institutionalized setting is correct, consensus process is

deeply conservative, privileging acquiescence with the status quo far more than does

voting.

It should be obvious that most forms of so-called "modified consensus" aren't any better

motivated. Requiring 3/4 or 2/3 for a positive decision to be taken still privileges

complacency over action. Unless one goes all the way to a principle like "attempt to find

consensus, and if that fails, vote" one is stuck with a procedure that is asymmetrical

between action and inaction. And I can see no way that one should embrace such

asymmetry.

I should emphasize that I'm not here criticizing the distinction within consensus procedure

between blocks and stand-asides. This is certainly a useful distinction. (Though one could

go further. Obviously our opposition to various proposals does not always fall neatly into

one of two categories. There is a range, even a multi-dimensional space, of attitudes

towards a given proposal that one could adopt. Support/stand-aside/ block is more nuanced

than support/oppose, but only by a factor of 3-2.) What I object to is any procedure that

isn't symmetrical between support and opposition to the proposal in question.

Suppose a Palestinian solidarity group is considering making a statement affirming the Right

of Return. Say some people feel deeply opposed to such a statement, while supporting the

goals and practices of the group in other ways, while others feel deeply committed to the

essentiality of such a statement, feeling that silence on that issue is an insult to the

majority of Palestinians who live as refugees. Why should either commitment be made more

important than the other, by the very rules of argument? In each case, one could have a

deeply held moral opposition/support, which one thought to be essential to the well being of

the group. However we settle this, choosing between

Formulation 1: We will affirm our support for the Right of Return

And

Formulation 2: We will take no stand on the Right of Return

and thereby choosing to give one or the other group veto power over the other, is clearly

not a rational way to settle things.

How such a deep dispute will go - extended debate, creative compromise, even the group

breaking up - should not be settled in the abstract, much less by some legislated structure

of group procedure. There is simply no way that a procedure that privileges one deep

conviction over another is going to help. We have to argue. And if argument fails, one

group is going to have to give up on a deeply held conviction. Aside from specific

arguments about the Right of Return, its political importance, the tactical issues of

affirming it or remaining silent, etc., how could one possibly think to find a wise

settlement. But that is exactly what Consensus rules purport to do - settle such disputes

formally, prior to substantive consideration of the issues.

§4:Virtuous practice and the need for procedure

I can well imagine a defender of consensus objecting to the previous argument. "Certainly,"

they might agree, "there is something inherently conservative in allowing one person veto

power over actions. But that is not a fair way to characterize consensus process. Consensus

requires that we don't think of the ability to block as a veto power available to us

whenever we disagree with the way the group is heading. Consensus procedure cannot be

divorced from consensus practice and evaluated separately, and when we look to them together

we see that blocks are only used when one has a deep objection to the action under

consideration, an objection that one sees as important enough to warrant preventing the

group from acting."

Such a response, however, misses the point for two reasons. First, there is still no

justification for the procedural asymmetry between action and inaction. Why not also give

everyone an "inaction block". Why, if I feel that failing to respond to, say, a

congressional declaration denouncing the Right of Return, is deeply morally impermissible,

indeed incompatible with the very point of our solidarity organization, should I not be able

to block our doing nothing? To say that I cannot do this in principle, while others can, in

principle, block doing anything about this racist bill, is to embrace a procedural

conservatism, no matter what else is packed into the account of practice.

The second problem is that appeal to good practice as a defense of a given procedure misses

the whole point of procedure. I noted earlier that the accounts of practice given by

sophisticated defenders of consensus and voting are remarkably similar. All focus on the

need to include the positions of everyone, to inculcate careful and critical rationality, to

be open to new ideas, to allow for creativity in the formulation of alternatives, to

appreciate the importance of reaching agreement, etc. In short, there is an emphasis in

these discussions on the kinds of virtues that democratic citizens must possess, and the

kinds of institutional habits and structures that are conducive to training new citizens to

embody such virtues and to maintain them in the ongoing group decision making.

Though, in this article I have nothing substantive to add to the discussion of democratic

practice,12 my point is surely not to criticize this emphasis. Indeed, however

virtuous practice is to be spelled out - and, again, for present purposes I want to take

some such idea for granted - my main point is to argue that the understanding,

implementation, and maintenance of virtuous practice is central to democratic society. But

at the moment, I ask the narrow question of what role there is for procedure when people and

groups fully embody rational, moral, and political virtues. We have already argued that

when people are sufficiently lacking in virtue, neither voting nor consensus procedure will

help. If a sizable percentage of the group is determined to abuse procedure, then whatever

procedure you choose will be abused.

But what if we have the opposite situation: everyone is virtuous - respectful of others yet

committed to arguing for the truth as they see it, listening carefully and critically, well

informed and sharing of information, interested in what is best for the group, its members,

and society as a whole, etc? Well, in a situation like this, just about any procedure will

do. It could be the "let Lelia decide" procedure, because Lelia, being virtuous, won't

decide without going through the whole open and inclusive discussion with her comrades. She

will take part in the discussion - not as a duty of fairness, but out of a desire to find

the truth - and at the end of the discussion, when the best position - as far as we are able

to determine in this context, with this information, given our level of intellectual skill -

emerges, she will choose that position, as would anyone else in our perfect community. And

exactly the same choice would result from voting, consensus, etc.

So if procedure is completely beside the point for fully virtuous groups, and helpless in

the face of highly vicious groups, when is it useful? Well clearly for those groups that

are somewhere in between. We rightly fall back on procedure precisely when a group that is

generally respectful and non-manipulative is running into local restricted difficulties.

Perhaps one or another person is feeling a bit intimidated and is not participating.

Perhaps there is a disagreement that we are not resolving by argument. Perhaps someone is

not bothering to do their homework before entering into discussion.

In a case like these, there is a point to engaging in some sort of reasonably well defined

procedure to attempt to deal with the problem - go around the room and ask everyone to speak

before others do, accept that moving forward is important and agree to vote, make up a list

of the things that people are responsible for studying before the meeting. Two points are

clear, however. First, while reasoned debate, respectful discussion, and other aspects of

practice are intrinsically valuable to this process, the point of procedures is purely

instrumental. We adopt procedures as a pragmatic tool for getting around a concrete problem

in the course of our discussions.

Not only must we see procedure as instrumentally pragmatic, but we must also recognize a

second point: that the usefulness of any procedure will vary widely with context. Since

there exists an enormous range of ways that things can go wrong in a group, we have no

reason to find one all-purpose procedure to fall back on - "well we try to discuss, but if

that fails, we vote", but why? Maybe what is called for is a go-around in which everyone

tries to come up with a possible resolution never before mentioned, or we go home and cool

off, or we bring in a facilitator, or we read a relevant book, or some of us stand aside, or

we divide into two groups, or merge with a larger one, etc. Each of these could be a

perfectly reasonable procedural response to a particular sort of problem.

Thus, what we need is not a procedure, much less an identification of good process

with such a procedure, but a well stocked tool kit of ways to deal with the sorts of

difficulties that come up within generally well-functioning, but fallible groups. And even

more, we need well skilled craftsman to use those tools. Just as some are skilled in

perceiving psychological symptoms, others at constructing experimental designs, and still

others at developing complex political strategies, there are those who have honed a serious

skill at mobilizing procedural tools to deal with the sorts of breakdowns that beset

discursive communities. These are the people we call facilitators, mediators, or trainers.

And we should make use of them. Of course this is not to say that we defer to facilitators

- mindlessly follow their guidance regarding process - anymore than we should defer to a

formal procedure. But if it seems to the group that someone is a useful facilitator - that

is, that they can help us by guiding us in the implementation of a range of contextually

useful procedures - we should take advantage of that.

§5: Practical endorsement of contextual procedures

When the group comes to the view that the most important thing is a decision, even though

discussion is not moving towards consensus on any particular decision, one fall-back is to

reach consensus on the appropriateness of voting. Such a decision should always be seen as

a recognition of some sort of failure. Assuming that the choice is substantive, then one

decision is, in reality, the better one. So the fact that we cannot find perceptions,

considerations, arguments, data and the like that supports one or the other is a sign that

we are arguing badly, are missing something, are not in possession of adequate data, or that

some of us are not being reasonable. But still, such kinds of things happen in the crush of

real-world circumstances, and when they do, we sometimes decide quite fairly, to

vote.

If we do so decide, then the argument of section 2 means that our procedure should be

symmetrical. Thus, while it need not be as simple as majority vote, the procedure will be

closer, in such a circumstance, to voting than to consensus procedure. But I want to urge

that it is misleading, nonetheless, to think of this as an endorsement of voting over

consensus.

By way of illustration, let me recall a particular decision taken by the Georgetown

philosophy department. On the day in question we had a highly disputed decision before us

for which there was no possible compromise. That is, this was the sort of decision for which

there were exactly two options. And the department came into the meeting strongly divided.

Group A felt that accepting the proposal before us was right and important for the future of

the department. Group B felt that rejecting the same decision was equally important. And

so, we discussed the matter. We argued, back and forth, brought up new considerations, laid

out ways of thinking about the issue, creatively tried to relate the decision to other ones

we had made, to contextualize the issue within the broader goals of the department, etc....

for several hours. And very few minds were changed. Sensing that we were making little

progress, the chair finally called for a vote. And the motion passed, something like 16 -

8, whereupon we prepared to leave, assuming the chair would pass this decision on to the

dean.

Before we could do so, the leading voice in Group A - the winning group - stopped us.

"Wait," she said.13 "I've never seen us adopt an important decision with such a

split vote. It may not be our rule, but it is our practice to discuss things until we

arrive at a view we all respect. And we always take account of everyone's concerns. I worry

that the minority are going to feel bullied here, and so think we should discuss this more."

Though not thrilled to have to stay longer, everyone immediately heeded the call and

resumed their chairs.

Whereupon the leading voice of the losing group said "Absolutely not. We made our

arguments, gave our reasons. As always, everyone listened, took us seriously, and we failed

to convince you. So I will not hear of re-opening the issue. We have a case where we

disagree and a strong majority of the department thinks one way. The only reasonable thing

for any of us to support in such a case is that vote as we find it."

What went on here: majority voting, or consensus? It is obviously misleading to

characterize things either way. We found no consensus on the issue at hand, but we equally

did not simply vote. Rather, we reached a consensus in favor of going with the majority

position. We recognized that our collective rationality, our group virtue, was insufficient

to reach a consensus on the issue at hand, and therefore made use of a formal voting

procedure. But our local failure sparked an expression of a deeper structural kind of

virtue - both virtue on the part of each participant, and a collective virtue embedded in

the habits of discourse among them. And it was precisely this kind of virtue which was

missing in the Mobilization for Global Justice. Rather than carry on respectful and careful

discussion until we found consensus, if not on what to do, at least on what procedure to

employ, a small minority forced the mechanical application of one particular procedure down

the throats of the majority on the grounds that it had been adopted earlier. In the context

of such social vice, it was no consolation whatsoever that the procedure had a happy name

like "consensus".

§6: Contentious concluding remarks

So where are we? Though I've hardly argued in detail for such grand claims, I urge that a

number of conclusions are made plausible by the foregoing discussion:

• A key goal of any anarchist strategy must be the development of discursive, social,

  and rational virtue in each other.




• Any viable anarchist society must institutionalize things like schools, discussion

  forums, and critical process discussions, which will allow us to form and maintain such

  virtues in ourselves.




• The only fully democratic way to reach a decision is to have a discussion the end of

  which is a consensus on what is the right decision.




• If our local lack of virtue prevents a fully democratic decision-making practice in a

  particular case, there are any number of procedural rules, and people skilled at applying

  such rules, to which we might turn in attempting to deal with the problem.




• If we find that we need to make a decision, but cannot reach consensus on what the right

  decision is, we should by all means give symmetrical authority to both action and inaction.

  There is no grounds for privileging one over the other in the abstract. (Of course we might

  agree that in this case either caution or action is to be privileged due to particular

  factors.)




• If we cannot come to consensus on a given issue, then the issue becomes how to make a

  decision, and consensus is demanded on this. Though we will likely vote, such a procedure

  can only be just on the basis of a rationally and morally arrived at consensus on the

  appropriateness of voting in this case. Voting is often the right procedure to turn to, and

  far more likely to be procedurally correct than is consensus procedure, but whatever

  authority voting procedure has will derive from consensus practice.

This all seems to point to a particular practical recommendation for anyone aiming to form

an anarchist organization: do not write down any procedure as part of the defining structure

of the group! Any procedure you try to legislate is as likely to be abused, as likely to

give people a crutch to lean on, or an excuse to avoid careful thinking, discussion, and

inclusive labor. No procedure guarantees wise decision making, and a wide variety of

procedures can be useful in arriving at wise decisions. So do not privilege one over

another in the abstract. If you must have a constitution, say "our group will attempt to

take each other seriously, to look at issues rationally, to engage in careful, respectful,

critical, rigorous analysis and argument, and to arrive at the wisest and most just

decisions on all issues before us." If you need to say more than this, then say much more.

Say that among the tools we will use in trying to arrive at such just and wise decisions are... and then initiate and ever-growing list of useful techniques.

Above all, remember that constitutions, like the rules they record, are no better than the

people who implement them. So the task is just as much to make better versions of ourselves

as it is to make better versions of society.

(Parts of this article are excerpted from the manuscript Awakening Reason which, with

any luck, will be completed in Fall 2005.)

Endnotes

1 "Coming to Consensus: Tips for Cooperation and Collaboration in Decision

Making, or How to Run Meetings So Everyone Wins" By Mark Shepard

[http://www.markshep.com/nonviolence/Consensus.htm l

2 Nonviolent Action Handbook

Group Process, by Sanderson Beck [http://www.san.beck.org/NAH1-Nonviolence.html]

3 "Notes on Consensus Decision Making," Randy Schutt

[http://www.vernalproject.org/RPapers.shtml#CoopDe cMaking]

4 "What is Communalism? The Democratic Dimension of Anarchism", Murray Bookchin - from

The Anarchy Archive

[http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/boo kchin/CMMNL2.MCW.html]

5 I have not researched this example, so I am simply taking Bookchin's word about it for

purposes of argument. Nothing of import here hangs on the actual case.


6 Lions and Tigers and Bears, oh my!

7 "A Revolutionary Decision-Making Process " [See

http://www.consensus.net/revolutionary.html]

8 The account that follows is from personal experience. I was centrally involved in the MGJ

planning process for this convergence. Though my work was primarily with the educational

series associated with the protests - the People's Summit - I also attended general MGJ

meetings. There are many others who have confirmed my memory of the events, though it is

only fair to say that there are also those who dispute this account of what went on. For

purposes of the general argument I am making here, nothing much hangs on this. You could

just as well treat this as a hypothetical example of a way that consensus procedure could be

abused. But I believe it is important for us to appreciate the real harm done, in the very

contexts in which we work, by such abuse. And it is also important for us to develop habits

of confronting efforts to so abuse our practice. I take the inclusion of a real case,

rather than a hypothetical one, to be a small step along the way toward such habits.

9 And the effects of this shameful manipulation were significant. The vacuum created by the

pullout of MGJ was filled predictably by ANSWER [IAC, WWP], a significant event in the (now,

apparently and thankfully, temporary) rise to prominence of this authoritarian organization.

So deep were the feelings of hurt and betrayal by the actions on this day and subsequent

"defenses" of them - defenses that often involved character assassination and verbal abuse -

that MGJ in its previous form effectively disbanded. Nearly all the grassroots activists

pulled out and joined other coalitions, generally with far fewer resources. Most NGOs

stayed, but their subsequent protest actions and educational events were a shadow of their

previous strength. It is noteworthy that one leader of the putsch in Sept. consistently

defended the choice to cancel events - I heard this defense four times at different forums

over the next two years - by saying that there had been consensus support for canceling, a

use of language that can only be called Orwellian.

10 It is worth saying explicitly that I am not suggesting anything about academia at large.

Few are the academic departments which function the way this one does. Many are irrational,

spiteful, dogmatic, and oppressive institutions.


11 Though the objection of this section is really quite obvious, so far as I know, it has

not been discussed elsewhere. Given the nature of the point, I would not be surprised to

learn, however, that it has been pointed out by someone I'm unaware of.

12 I have a good deal to add, both in terms of the underlying philosophical ideas and

specific practices, in Awakening Reason.

13 Roughly. This is not an exact quote, but closely captures what was said.