The U.S. and Europe: Quasi-Allies
Immanuel Wallerstein

George W. Bush, having failed to intimidate Europe in his first term of
office, has decided to try another tactic. First, Condoleeza Rice, then
Donald Rumsfeld, then Bush himself traveled to Europe on a charm offensive.
They all said essentially the same three things. Let's forget our quarrels
over Iraq; the U.S. considers Europe its allies; and let's discuss what the
U.S. wants now and what we can do together. But they all added a fourth
thing: The U.S. will still do what it wants, if the Europeans won't go
along. In a press conference in Europe, Bush said about the debate with
Europeans concerning Iran: "The notion that the United States is getting
ready to attack Iran is simply ridiculous. Having said that, all options
are on the table."The list of issues on which the U.S. and Europe disagree in important ways
is impressively long: the Iraq war and current relations with the Iraqi
regime; the treatment of prisoners in Guantanamo; the policy to be pursued
on Israel/Palestine; how to handle the issue of nuclear proliferation in
Iran, and in North Korea; whether to maintain the arms embargo on China;
the Cuba embargo; whether NATO should continue to be the primary structure
within which U.S.-Europe relations occur, as opposed to the U.S. dealing
with the European Union; Galileo versus the GPS as satellite navigational
systems; the urgency of climate change and the Kyoto Protocol; support for
the International Criminal Court; mutual complaints (and threats of
reprisals) concerning industrial subsidies; the genetic modifications of
agricultural seed; rivalry of Boeing and Airbus; and last but not least the
rise of the euro as a potential world reserve currency.

There are several things to note about this list. They include just about
every immediately important geopolitical issue. They include a large number
of the central issues of the world-economy. They are almost all issues on
which the disagreements go back many years now. They are almost all issues
on which the divergence of positions is quite large. They are all issues
about which both sides feel very strongly, and on which it is difficult to
see too much room for compromise. And one last thing to notice. If one asks
what the position of Russia is on these issues, in most cases, Russia takes
the same position as Europe.

So, in what sense can one say that the United States and Europe continue to
be allies? Well, they do share some important interests in common. They are
both major centers of capital accumulation. They are both concerned with
maintaining the stability of the world-economy. They are both wary of the
growing demands of countries of the South in the North-South negotiations
within the framework of the World Trade Organization. In short, neither
wants to see any radical transformation of the world-system in which we are
living. These concerns were the basis of the historic alliance between the
U.S. and Europe, and they haven't disappeared.

So, one could argue that the discord is merely an argument over strategy,
in which both sides share common goals. And, in a sense, this is what
European leaders have been arguing for some time. But they haven't seemed
to persuade the United States of this. The U.S. is not used to debating
strategy with its allies. It has been used to deciding upon strategy and
merely discussing marginal tactical issues with its allies, who used to be
not truly allies but rather loyal followers. The combination of the
economic decline of the United States, the end of the Cold War, and the
fiasco in Iraq has undermined the entire bargaining power of the United
States.

The Bush administration still cannot believe that this has really happened.
The charm offensive has been just that - sweet words. One prominent
observer has seen this clearly. William Cohen, longtime Republican Senator
from Maine and Secretary of Defense under Clinton, attended one of the many
occasions in recent days in which the U.S. was peddling its new line in
Europe. He said, "The tone was different, but the tune was the same." Nor
have the Europeans been fooled. Jacques Chirac smiled demurely at Bush and
conceded to the U.S. one of its important demands, that the military
trainers for the Iraqi forces be under NATO command. France assigned one
officer to this task. Vladimir Putin responded to his gentle chiding by
George Bush by confirming Russia's commitment to furnish enriched nuclear
material to Iran and advanced surface-to-air missiles to Syria.

In September of 2004, I wrote a commentary entitled "Neither Feared Nor
Loved?" in which I suggested that the U.S. may have to deal realistically
with disposing of neither advantage. I am happy to report that this theme
has now been taken up by one of the mainstream journals of the U.S., Time
Magazine. In its Feb. 21, 2005 issue, Tony Karon writes: "the reality is
that the Bush administration is neither loved nor feared in growing sectors
of the international community - increasingly, it is simply being ignored."

Neither Europe nor Russia nor for that matter China wants to engage in
open, bloody fights with the United States. But neither do any of them want
to concede important ground to the increasingly bizarre positions of the
United States. Europe is settling into the position of a quasi-ally, an
indulgent cousin which humors the United States when it must and ignores it
most of the rest of the time. And the U.S. must now decide whether it will
react petulantly (and dangerously) by demonstrating that it still has
powerful military toys by striking out with them, or retreat into a shell,
or consider maturely what are its real options in the twenty-first century.
Under Bush, I would not bet on the last option.