The Nuclear Club Expands
By Immanuel Wallerstein

North Korea has now said officially that it already has nuclear weapons, and is not at all interested
in discussing giving them up. Iran still claims it
doesn't intend to make nuclear weapons. However it also says it will not
discuss abandoning the progress it has made in developing nuclear enrichment
facilities (which means of course that it could easily produce nuclear
weapons when it wished to do so). And what does the United States say? The
United States doesn't know what to say and is floundering. Henry Kissinger
is sputtering, in print and on television. Condoleeza Rice is calling Iran a
totalitarian state and telling the Europeans that they have to tell Iran
clearly and loudly that, if Iran persists in its nuclear enrichment program,
there will be U.N. sanctions (and the Europeans are telling her that such
statements by her, made publicly or even privately, are distinctly
counterproductive).The fact is that, thanks to George W. Bush, the genie is long since out of
the bottle. And thanks again to George W. Bush, the United States doesn't
have the military or political strength to do anything about it. So what
happens now? There are really only two scenarios possible for the next three
years or so. One is that nothing significant happens in either Korea or
Iran, as the U.S. finds itself too preoccupied with the continuing
difficulties of getting out of the Iraq quagmire, too absorbed in its
increasingly harsh internal political battles, and too isolated
diplomatically to do more than alternately bluster and keep quiet. And the
other scenario is that the superhawks overwhelm all resistance within the
Bush administration, including that of the armed forces, and precipitate a
military confrontation, either directly or through a third party (such as
Israel for Iran).

I myself think that the second scenario is not very likely. It has at most a
quite small chance of coming to pass, but it is no doubt possible. And if it
did occur, it would be disastrous - in terms of lives lost (of Koreans or
Iranians of course but also of Americans), especially if nuclear weapons
were used. The most probable result would be a military impasse as well as
serious worldwide ecological damage. So, even if the likelihood is small, it
is quite scary, and it is the path of both wisdom and sanity to do
everything that one can do to avert it.

If however we have the more likely scenario - that nothing really happens in
either arena - what are the geopolitical consequences? They are quite
negative for the United States, which is what is agitating Kissinger and
probably also Condoleeza Rice. The first consequence is a further change in
the world's estimate of U.S. military clout. Once thought virtually
invincible, the overwhelming military power of the U.S. has been losing its
ability to impress the world with "shock and awe" as it promised in the
inimitable prose adopted by the Bush administration. The successful defiance
of the U.S. by North Korea and/or Iran on such a key military issue would
accelerate the growing feeling around the world that the U.S. is a Goliath
just waiting for a David to humiliate it. This would undoubtedly harden
everyone's readiness to go their own way, whether or not it met with
approval in Washington.

What does going one's own way mean? It means, for one thing, that a number
of other countries (beyond North Korea and Iran) might now begin to take
serious steps in the direction of nuclear weaponry. It means that a number
of countries will be more willing to take a tough line on bilateral or
multilateral trade negotiations with the United States or the North in
general. And it means that many, many countries will be willing to move away
from a dollar-dominated world. Russia has already announced that it is going
to price its oil in euros from now on. Others may follow soon. China has
already indicated that it is thinking of pegging the yuan not to the dollar
but to a basket of currencies. And then someday soon there might occur the
U.S. nightmare - a sudden widespread loss of confidence in the dollar which,
once it occurred, would probably be irreversible and would wreak havoc with
the brittle finances of the U.S. government.

Nor would this be all. The U.S. is crowing these days over the Jan. 30
elections in Iraq, which President Bush called a "resounding success"
reflecting "the voice of freedom." While the provisional figures are no
doubt a bit inflated, it is clear that most Shiites and most Kurds voted,
and that the Iraqi resistance could manage to kill only their usual quota
that day. Is this so surprising? That more were not killed is a tribute to
the intensive U.S. military mobilization (including the banning of cars
moving on the streets). But was it surprising that Shiites voted? We have to
remember that nine months ago, both the U.S. and Iyad Allawi were strongly
opposed to holding these elections for an interim national assembly
(primarily serving as a constitutional convention) at all, expecting that
they would put the Shiites in a commanding political position, and Iyad
Allawi out of a job.

If the U.S. yielded, it was precisely because Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani made
it clear that holding the elections were his bottom line, or else he would
denounce publicly the U.S. occupation. Al-Sistani got his way, so of course
the Shiites voted. As for the Kurds, a big Kurd turnout was their best
guarantee to maintain at a minimum the degree of autonomy they now have de
facto in their zones. The Sunni, as expected, effectively boycotted the
vote. Also, amidst this "voice of freedom," the Kurds managed largely to
keep the minority Christians and Turkomens in their areas from voting, since
that would have diminished the percentages for the Kurdish list.

We shall have to see what happens now. But there is little likelihood that
the U.S. will have the kind of government it had hoped to have. And there is
little likelihood that the Iraqi resistance will fold until the U.S.
withdraws its troops. The euphoria over the elections in the U.S. press may
well soon fade into recognizing the reality of an endless low-intensity but
major military conflict which will continue to drain money and lives and
therefore the patience of the U.S. population. In the middle of all this,
Iran may set off its nuclear test. The uproar in the West will of course be
great. The popular approbation in Iran (but not only in Iran) will also be
great. But after that, we may all settle down to a new status quo, as the
geopolitical realities continue to evolve in a direction that George W. Bush
will certainly not relish.