"China and the U.S.: Competing Geopolitical Strategies"

by Immanuel Wallerstein

Ever since Richard Nixon went to China on Feb. 21, 1972 to visit Mao
Zedong, the world's geopolitical alignments have never been the same. The
meeting represented a spectacular shift in geopolitical hostilities of the
post-1945 period. The major consequence was that China and the United
States ceased to act as though each were the other's primary enemy, and
acted as though each were a potential collaborator of the other on the
world scene - collaborator, which is less than an ally. Each has been
careful to do nothing that would allow for a return to the pre-1972 period
which had seen open warfare in Korea and unlimited rhetorical harangue
across the world. This cautious, even wary, relationship has continued
unabated up to today and has survived intact even during the era of U.S.
neo-conservative aggressive foreign policy under George W. Bush.Initially what brought the two countries together was the desire of each to
constrain, even diminish, the power of the Soviet Union. But they soon
discovered that each could have important economic benefits out of a less
antagonistic relationship. And each had long-term visions which they
thought might be served by this curious bilateral arrangement. The U.S.
sought to tame China, to bring it out of its Maoist cocoon and into the
market whirl of the capitalist world-economy. China sought to buy
technology, trade, and above all time in which to strengthen its economy
and its military, and enable it to become a superpower. To some extent,
each has been served well thus far in terms of what it sought to achieve.

But as we move forward into the twenty-first century, it is becoming clear
that each is pursuing a quite different geopolitical strategy in its
semi-friendly but intense competition with the other. Any major power in
the interstate system has four different cards to play in its search for
power and preeminence: the economic, the political, the military, and the
cultural-ideological cards. But of course the cards each has to play are
not equally strong, and the choice in foreign policy is always which one or
ones to emphasize.

The United States is a declining hegemonic power. Its economic card has
been on the decline for almost forty years. Bush's incredible expansion of
national debt has made the U.S. economic situation far worse than it was
even five years ago. U.S. manufacturing is for the most part a doomed
export and now we learn that Brazil may displace the U.S. as an
agricultural exporter - one of the last advantages in production of the
U.S. on the world economic scene. The declining economic strength of the
U.S. has diminished its political strength, particularly but not only in
Europe, and Bush's Iraq fiasco has intensified the negative feelings
considerably. As for the cultural-ideological strength of the U.S., the
collapse of the Soviet Union undid the major argument which it had been
using to rally support around the world. And the efforts of the U.S. to use
the "war against terrorism" as an ideological substitute has fallen very flat.

So, the U.S. has had to fall back on the only strong card it has left - the
military card. However, even here the U.S. is doing less well than one
might have expected. It has shown in Iraq, once again, that it is basically
incapable of dealing with a nationalist insurgency. Still, the U.S. retains
an incredible edge in military hardware, and it is pouring an immense
proportion of its national wealth into maintaining and expanding this edge.

The key to U.S. military superiority remains nuclear weapons, which
explains why the U.S. continues an almost hysterical concern with nuclear
proliferation. It is however becoming clear, even to the Bush
administration, that the U.S. is isn't going to be able to stop a series of
countries from obtaining nuclear weapons. North Korea and Iran may head the
list, but there is a long list quietly (or not so quietly) starting to jump
on the bandwagon. When the U.S. can't get even Great Britain to align
itself on its struggle to keep Iran in line, it is in bad shape politically.

This doesn't mean that the U.S. is abandoning the effort to maintain an
unquestioned military lead. It is moving full speed ahead in developing
itself the so-called mini-nukes. These mini-nukes are actually reasonably
powerful. They have about the power of the bombs that were used over
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They have, however, two features that are
different: they can burrow deep into the ground (and therefore of enemy
shelters), and they cause less collateral damage, which supposedly will
make them less politically objectionable. The U.S. is proceeding with their
production at Los Alamos, and will probably be testing them soon. These
mini-nukes are not meant as a deterrent but for actual pre-emptive use. If
the U.S. does succeed in making viable mini-nukes, we may expect a new
worldwide arms race to try to counter this U.S. advantage.

Meanwhile, China is on a different tack. It is to be sure intent on
strengthening its military apparatus. But it will be a while before China
can in any sense be a peer to the U.S. on this front. China also maintains
a low political profile on the world scene. It consists mainly of
cultivating better relations with just about everyone. But China is
certainly not yet ready today to be a major political player. Furthermore,
China's ideological stance is, to say the least, confusing. It is a "market
socialist state" - the meaning of which no one is totally sure. It
sometimes remembers its position of the old days of the Bandung conference,
as a leader of the Third World, but most of the time, it is relatively
quiet on North-South issues.

China's main card today is the economic card. It is a rising economic
power. How powerful it might come to be is as yet unsure. But it is
patiently expanding its role. A Chinese firm has just bought out IBM's
personal computer division and is now the third largest firm in the world.
China is a mainstay of the U.S. dollar by investing in U.S. treasury bonds.
This gives China more economic control over the U.S. than vice versa, since
a withdrawal of these investments or even a rapid lessening of their extent
could wreak economic havoc on the U.S. China has cultivated excellent
relationships with Iran, which enhances its needed access to petroleum.

And most interesting of all, on November 29, 2004, China signed a deal with
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that is being hailed as
"historic" and which moves towards establishing a trade bloc that rivals
those of the U.S. and the European Union. This agreement creates a market
zone of two billion people, and it will be accompanied by new road and rail
links between China and Southeast Asia. What China needs to do to complete
this solid base is to come to an economic arrangement with Japan. This is
an objective that is complicated by long-standing political and military
concerns on both sides. But it seems economically so advantageous to both
China and Japan in the long run that it is hard to see that it will not
come to pass.

The U.S. emphasis on the military card has the flavor of desperation.
China's emphasis on building slowly its economic base seems by contrast an
act of patience. Perhaps this is the story of the tortoise and the hare.

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These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections
on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the
immediate headlines but of the long term.]