"Filipino Lessons for America's Strategy in Iraq"

William Niskanen, Financial Times

[The writer, an economist and former defence analyst, is chairman of the
Cato Institute, a prominent right-libertarian think-tank.]

America's first experience of a relatively "easy" war followed by an
extended period of guerrilla combat was not in Iraq; it was a century ago
in the Philippines. Max Boot, the neoconservative commentator, described
the defeat of the Filipino insurrection as "one of the most successful
counterinsurgencies waged by a western army in modern times;" a model of
how US forces could prevail in Iraq." The parallels to date however, are
ominous.First, some brief history: in December 1897, Commodore George Dewey left
the US to head the US Navy's Asiatic Squadron with orders to attack the
Spanish naval forces in the Philippines, in the event of a war with Spain.

Following increasing disorder in Havana, an explosion aboard the USS Maine
(which been sent there) and a stream sensational newspaper stories about
Spain's alleged atrocities in Cuba, the US Congress declared war on Spain
on April 25, 1898. On May l, Dewey's squadron destroyed Spain's ships in
Manila Bay within a few hours, sustaining only a few non-fatal casualties.

A Filipino insurrection against Spanish rule had been under way since 1896,
and a US gunboat brought Emilio Aguinaldo, the exiled Filipino leader, back
from Hong Kong to lead a renewed revolt. The Filipino insurgents defeated
the Spanish forces almost everywhere in the country except in Manila before
8,500 US army troops arrived after Filipino leaders issued a declaration of
national independence in June.

The US troops crossed Filipino lines to engage the Spanish troops in
Manila, who surrendered swiftly on August 13. The Filipinos welcomed the US
troops as liberators, but that soon changed. In a US agreement with the
Spanish captain general, the Filipino forces were kept out of Manila and
given no role in the surrender. After the capture of Manila, the US refused
to recognise the new Philippine Republic, and signed a peace treaty with
Spain on December 10 that ceded the Philippines to the US. Shortly after,
the US announced it would establish military rule in the Philippines.
President William McKinley stated that US objectives were to "educate the
Filipinos and uplift and civilise and Christianise them".

On February 4, 1899, US troops provoked an incident with Filipino forces
surrounding Manila that led to many Filipino casualties. That event, in
turn, triggered a broad Filipino insurrection of unexpected severity and
duration. The insurrection lessened somewhat after the capture of Aguinaldo
in 1901, but sporadic combat continued throughout the decade.

The insurrection involved more than 120,000 US troops and 4,000 US
fatalities. Filipino combat fatalities were about 20,000 and more than
200,000 Filipinos died during the insurrection, many from cholera. In a
grim potential parallel, the Philippines was not granted complete
independence until 1946.

Some of the more obvious parallels with Iraq include the way the McKinley
administration planned for war against Spain months before the reported
disorder in Havana and the explosion on the Maine. The administration
planned to attack Spanish forces in the Philippines even though the public
rationale for war against Spain was to restore order in Cuba. However, the
administration had made no plans to respond to Filipino demands for
independence, despite the long insurrection against Spain and the
insurgents' victory over Spanish forces throughout most of the Philippines
before the US arrived.

The US rhetoric supporting the military occupation of the Philippines
reflected both an imperialistic perspective and a paternalistic attitude
toward the Filipinos. Their insurrection involved many more US troops and
casualties than expected; and Aguinaldo's capture was not sufficient to end
the insurrection.

It is not clear whether other dimensions of the Filipino insurrection will
have parallels in Iraq; for one thing, it is not yet obvious whether the US
public will continue to support US policies in Iraq. In contrast with US
policy in the Philippines, the Bush administration now appears ready to
restore limited sovereignty to the Iraqis. But how long will US troops have
to remain to restore a minimally acceptable level of security?

The main lesson from both the Filipino insurrection and Iraq is that these
wars, both emerging from other concerns, turned out to be more severe and
protracted than expected. This does not provide very helpful guidance to
near term US policy in Iraq. Longer term, however, it should help avoid
such tragic and unnecessary wars.