Radical media, politics and culture.

Karantina, "Diebold Voting Systems"

Karantina writes:

"Diebold Voting Systems"

Karantina

DIEBOLD! If “Perception is Reality” what is Diebold afraid of?

Recently a string of leaked e-mails has come to light that are creating
panic amongst the  executives of Diebold
Election Systems
. Diebold is the second largest, and fastest
growing electronic voting corporation in the world, and produces touch
screen voting stations used in 37 states in the country. Touch screen
voting booths will sound familiar to many Californian voters because
these were the same machines that were used throughout the state during
the Oct. 7th Recall Election.Diebold machines were also used in the Georgia 2002 general elections
with disastrous results
Voters were helpless when they tried to pick their choice, but saw only
the Republican candidate receiving the vote.  There were also
numerous problems with machines both missing and not working. 
Workers were censored
from speaking with politicians who might oppose the political
orientation of the Diebold management.



After the California recall elections officials worked around the clock
trying to sort out problems with malfunctioning machines.  There
have also been problems with poorly trained employees.  The
Diebold employee manual
specifically states that “you will be considered the paragon of
knowledge and authority…even though you may be the least qualified
person on site…do not promote your ignorance”  It even goes on to
tell employees not to “offer damaging opinions of our systems, even
when their failings become obvious”.



A total of approximately 15,000 internal e-mails form a Diebold mailing
list for technical support has been leaked and hosted on the website Blackboxvoting.org.
Only days before the election Diebold lawyers forced the site down
claiming that the memos were under their copyright, and that Harris,
the owner of the site, was effectively stealing Diebold property. By
doing this Diebold has acknowledged the validity of the e-mails.
Recently the Bay Area Independent Media Center has also came under
attack from Diebold for a post on
it’s open publishing newswire. The host for the  Bay Area
Independent Media Center, Online Policy
Group
, received a cease
and desist letter
  on October 10th where OPG is given 24 hours
to remove the posting and the immediate comments that were added
featuring mirror sites to the memos (a mirror web site is a copy of the
original site in order for easier, faster and uninhibited access for
users of the world wide web)



Comically, the author of the cease and desist letter, Ralph E. Jocke,
representing Diebold, also comments on the success of the open
publishing system employed by the Indymedia newswire, stating that a
third mirror had been added by a user between the time the letter was
drafted and the time it was sent to OPG.

  

Amongst the revelations within these memos is the lack of security
against tampering within the program and, in fact, praise for security
modifications by election officials in Washington state. The engineer,
Clark, in one of his
e-mails
, addresses security concerns when he says  “Jane (I
think it was Jane) did some fancy footwork on the.mdb file in Gaston
recently. I know our dealers do it. King County is famous for it.
That's why we've never put a password on the file before.” After the
leak of the memos King County election chief, Dean Logan, vowed to
resolve security issues, and in fact limited employee access to voting
machines prior to the day of election.



What’s the panic about?


What was revealed independently by both Beverly  Harris (author of
Black Box Voting, available online in pdf format here) and by the memos is a
ridiculously easy way to tamper with the election results. Both sources
clearly indicate that the audit reports of the computer that tallies
the results from all of the touch screen results can be changed 
by an off-the-shelf version of Microsoft Access. With this the totals
can be changed without a trace due to the easy access of the audit
file. In fact, according to Harris a voting activist named Jim March
has made a CD to
illustrate how easily this is done and to use it as a lobbying device
against the present system of electronic voting.



The leaked memos were sent out by an unknown insider to various
websites and media organizations including Scoop
Media,
who hosted the 15,000 pieces of Diebold e-mail before it
came underneath pressure from Diebold. Diebold has claimed ownership of
the memos and has threatened
to sue
Scoop and other websites.



After the cease and desist letter sent to the web host of Indymedia,
Open Publishing Group, the online free speech advocacy group the
Electronic Frontier Foundation issued a press
release
discounting the validity of the efforts Diebold’s lawyers
have been making in order to keep the controversial information secret.
According to the EFF the Online Policy Group Executive Director Will
Doherty has stated “We defend strongly the free speech right of our
client IndyMedia to publish links to Diebold memos relevant to the
public debate about electronic voting machine security. Diebold's claim
of copyright infringement from linking to information posted elsewhere
on the Web is ridiculous, and even more silly is the claim that we as
an ISP could be liable for our client's web links.”



No Paper Trail


Another of the major complaints by electronic voting experts and
computer scientists is the lack of auditing, or proof, that is
done.  To put it simply, there is no proof that the voter’s actual
choice is registered.  There can be no recount, and no proof of
voting. According to a lengthy interview
conducted by William Rivers Pitt with Rebecca Mercuri, Barbara Simons,
and David Dill, all noted computer scientists, the system can be
significantly improved by simply printing a paper ballot after each
vote is cast and that the voter can verify and drop into a ballot box.
These paper ballots can enable a successful recount. Currently this is
not possible because any bugs in the original programming will
influence the electronic source of the recount as well. According to
Rebecca Mercuri, when the proposal of printing a ballot receipt at the
end of each vote was brought to Diebold they replied that it would be
too expensive to install printers in their machines. Later it became
obvious that the machines come installed with printers as it is but
they are only used at the start and end of the election day. The almost
rhetorical question remains; why do the e-voting companies not improve
their voting process significantly with the technology that is already
there?

    

The issue of the secrecy of the source code used by Diebold and other
e-voting corporations is another problem. These issues would have never
surfaced unless the source code of Diebold programming had not been
uncovered by computer science graduate students in Johns Hopkins and
others in CalTech. The lack of transparency offered by Diebold in
voting systems does not seem to apply to their own source codes and to
more than a quarter million of Texas voters’ private information,
including social security numbers and party affiliation, that were
available
for download from their web site.



From Public Elections to Corporate Elections


Electronic Voting Systems have a long, and
problematic history
. Chapter 2 in Beverly Harris’s book, Black
Box Voting, details the many miscounts that have occurred since the
advent of electronic voting.  There are three major players in
this game of voter manipulation: ES&S (the largest), Diebold, and
Sequoia.  In Texas in 1996 800 votes were recorded, although only
500 people voted.  In the 1998 general election in Dallas, over
41,000 votes were not counted.  ES&S took responsibility for
that little mishap.  In the same year in Pima County, AZ no votes
were recorded in 24 precincts, although the voter record showed that
thousands had voted. Also in that year, in the school bond election for
Orange County, CA there was a 100% error when the ‘yes’ and ‘no’
answers were switched by an unknown programmer. In 2000 a test machine
in Iowa was fed 300 votes, but reported four million.  On November
5, 2002 in Broward County, FL 103,222 votes were left out of the final
tally.  Recently in King County, WA the polls in one precinct were
tallied
hours before the polls closed
.  

    

Dieboldanegger?
    

Californian
voters are skeptical
of the heavy involvement between Diebold and
the electoral apparatus.  Diebold’s CEO is Wally O’Dell, a member
of “Rangers” and “Pioneers”, the elite group of Bush supporters who
commit to raising funds for W.  O’Dell recently spent time with
Bush at his Crawford, Texas ranch, and then sponsored a $600,000
fundraiser for Dick Cheney.  He also came away from the vacation
“committed to helping Ohio deliver its electoral votes to the president
next year”.

   

Electronic voting booths are supposed to be run through multiple tests,
which Diebold claims to have completed.  Their “independent”
observer, however, was Scientific Application International
Corporation.  SAIC is one of the major players in the corporate
game of rebuilding Iraq.  It is one of the top ten companies to
receive defense contracts.  It regularly works with Vinnell
Corporation, one of the leaders in training foreign militaries. 
It is almost entirely made up of retired military and intelligence
personnel, including Dr. Steven Hatfill, a former germ warfare
scientist.  It’s director is retired General Wayne Downing, of the
U.S. Army, who also served on the board of the Committee for the
Liberation of Iraq with Bechtel director George Shultz.  He was
also a lobbyist for the U.S. backed Iraqi National Congress. For more
info click here.  
 



Events such as the electoral drama in Florida in the 2000 presidential
race have influenced the general disillusionment regarding the indirect
democracy afforded by voting.  The two party system that requires
one to be wealthy in order to have a say in policies (that affect
billions of people around the world) is still regarded as democracy by
many citizens of the US. Will this misperception continue when the
outcome of an election is decided pre-emptively, with no façade
of choice? “Of course everyone knows perception is reality” begins an
e-mail from Diebold chief engineer Ken Clark.  If this is the
case, and Diebold is creating the perception of an elected candidate,
what does it have to fear from its leaked memos?  The issue for
Diebold is that their façade is crumbling, and perception is
ever more becoming a matter of reality.  It is now up to those
voters who feel disenfranchised from the electoral process to demand
that their voices are heard: Will the U.S. hold up this farce of a
democracy in the face of such blatant disregard for the
people?