A Short History of Franco-US Discord

Paul-Marie de la Gorce, http://MondeDiplo.com/2003/03/07franceusa

The current frost between France and the United States is not new. They have often disagreed over the past 45 years: France refused to allow US missiles stationed on its soil, withdrew from Nato's command structure, and recognised communist China even though it horrified the US.The Iraq crisis has undoubtedly opened a rift between the United States and France that will be hard to forget, let alone bridge. But does it mark the start of a new phase in Franco-American discord? To measure the significance of recent events we need to see them in the context of the disagreements that have marred relations between the countries since the late 1950s.



In 1958, when General de Gaulle returned to power, he already had a firmly established worldview and a clear idea of how France should respond. He was convinced the Soviet Union no longer wanted, and perhaps was no longer able, to extend its empire into western Europe. And the USSR had to cope with the rivalry of China. As he wrote: "If you no longer make war, sooner or later you must make peace." The balance of nuclear terror between the two great powers ruled out direct confrontation with nuclear weapons. But this also meant that the US nuclear arsenal could not be relied upon to defend Europe. De Gaulle concluded that France must regain its freedom of action by withdrawing from Nato. And it should establish new relations with the USSR and China to achieve better understanding and cooperation with eastern bloc countries. It must acquire its own nuclear deterrent.



His analysis and the policies it inspired resulted in profound disagreement with the US. This became immediately apparent, in July 1958, when De Gaulle met the then US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. The Soviet threat to Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia was central to the US perception of the world. To counter it Dulles recommended bolstering Nato's political and military strength and setting up a regional defence system based on medium-range missiles and US tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Europe.



De Gaulle rejected each point. He argued that Soviet policy was primarily national or nationalist. It used communism just as a pretext, "much as you use Congress", he told Dulles. France would not allow US nuclear weapons to be based on its territory unless it had complete control over them (which the US did not want). He suggested that the balance of nuclear deterrence would inhibit the great powers' dealings with one another and warned that France was planning to build its own nuclear weapons. When discussions turned to the crisis in Lebanon, where a US expeditionary force would soon land, he called for a drive to reinforce the independence of Middle Eastern countries rather than turning the area into another cold war battleground.



Although the ongoing war in Algeria dominated French politics, De Gaulle's first decisions as president gave an indication of the future, notably with France's refusal to allow medium-range missiles to be deployed there. De Gaulle started corresponding with US President Dwight Eisenhower. He attached a memorandum advocating permanent consultation between the US, Britain and France, addressing all international affairs, including nuclear questions. He had few illusions as to the US response: "They will not accept it," he told General Gelée, his emissary to Washington, and he was quite right.



De Gaulle got on well with President Jack Kennedy, who welcomed his decision to recognise Algeria's right to self-determination and his firmness in the Berlin crisis (1958-62). Kennedy was also glad of De Gaulle's support during the Cuban missile crisis in 1963 (though De Gaulle had decided in 1958 that France would have no part in the US blockade of Cuba). But these good relations did not distract him from his ultimate goal: France's withdrawal from Nato and its integrated command structure. This was finally achieved in March 1966. The change in French policy was immediate and particularly apparent in cooperation with third world countries. Breaking with the practice of large British and US companies, a new type of relationship was established with Algeria, Iran and subsequently Iraq. This was the first time that links between an advanced industrial nation and relatively underdeveloped countries had concerned every aspect of production and trade. In Laos and Cambodia France supported governments keen to defend their independence and neutrality towards the US, which wanted to enrol them as allies in its war against North Vietnam and the emerging Vietcong threat in the south of Vietnam.



The establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1964, one of De Gaulle's original object ives, was ultimately the most important move and certainly the one that prompted the most outspoken reactions by the US. The war in Vietnam underlined the profound disagreement between France and the US, which was convinced it was a vital part of the East-West divide. De Gaulle condemned the war, maintaining that the only way out of it was through dialogue and an agreement with the "real political forces", which he referred to as the "national resistance movement" (1), regardless of the regime that initially took power.



He adopted the same approach in Latin America, travelling there to proclaim that rejecting US hegemony did not necessarily imply support for and from the Soviet bloc. Here again independ ence was possible. The Dominican Republic offered a dramatic illustration of this, with France publicly condemning President Lyndon Johnson's dispatch of an expeditionary force to restore the military dictatorship in 1965. De Gaulle's support for French Canadians in 1967, and his celebrated cry of "Vive le Québec libre!", seemed to be a further challenge to Anglo-Saxon domination in North America.



In the Middle East, he managed to strike a balance between excellent relations with the Israeli leader, David Ben Gurion, and warnings against measures that might hurt the feelings of the Arab population and get in the way of reconciling their rights with those of the Israelis. But his denunciation of the Six Day War in 1967 (2) prompted another clash with the US administration.



De Gaulle was openly critical of the international monetary system, which made the dollar a reserve currency and gave the US considerable power, not least because it could ignore the usual rules on budget deficits. His widely reported attitude triggered a sharp response in the US press, which compared him to Goldfinger, the James Bond villain who attempted to rob Fort Knox.



Subsequent changes in the international context inevitably affected the course of Gaullist policy. The first major turning point came in 1981 when François Mitterrand won the French presidential election, a change of political direction that coincided with the final phase of the cold war. Two months later the Group of Seven summit meeting in Ottawa, which convened to discuss political, economic and strategic issues, was a further step towards turning the US-led bloc into an institution. There was a second upset in 1991 with the break-up of the Soviet Union. This could have been an opportunity to question the relevance of Nato and the dominant role played by the US; instead it became an excuse to extend the alliance's responsibilities and ultimately enlarge its membership.



France went along with this trend. Mitterrand failed to convince the other European Union members that they should form a European defence system, separate from Nato. To gain acceptance for the idea, his successor, Jacques Chirac, agreed to it being integrated in Nato. The agreement reached in Berlin in June 1996 stipulated that use of European forces would require Nato, in other words US, consent, and would be dependent on Nato infrastructures. The Franco-German declaration of December 1996 emphasised that the transatlantic ties were permanent and untouchable.



When France rejoined the council of Nato defence ministers and its military committee, Chirac suggested that it should also be represented in the integrated command structure. But he added that this should be conditional on responsibility for Nato's southern flank being given to one of the European nations bordering the Mediterranean. The US naturally refused.



Meanwhile the war in Yugoslavia had highlighted Europe's military weakness and the discord among its members. They had no choice but to appeal to Nato for help. Following suit, the UN decided Nato should act as its armed representative. The war in Kosovo completed this process. The US decided to do without the UN altogether, opting to make exclusive use of Nato, with its integrated forces, including the French.



The decisions taken by US leaders since the end of the cold war have extended Nato's sphere of influence and the area in which it may intervene. It has been enlarged to include former eastern bloc countries, fearful that only the US can guarantee their safety. France went along with this, until events in the Middle East and its divergence with the US brought home the full impact of these changes. After giving in on so many issues a crisis was inevitable, perhaps marking the start of a new phase in transatlantic relations.

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* Paul-Marie de La Gorce is a journalist and author of De Gaulle, Perrin, Paris, 2000.



(1) Speech in Phnom Penh in 1965.



(2) Apart from the disputed phrase in which he supposedly referred to a "dominating, self-assured people", De Gaulle once said that Israel "in the territories it has seized, is organising an occupation that cannot continue without oppression, repression and expulsion. Furthermore resistance to it is appearing, which it refers to as terrorism."



 
Translated by Harry Forster