See Ernest Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity,
Evidence and Economic Applications, Institute for Empirical Research
in Economics, University of Zurich, Working Paper No. 75 (February
2001);
Bruno S. Frey and Stephan Meier, Pro-Social Behavior, Reciprocity,
or Both? Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University
of Zurich, Working Paper No. 107 (February 2002);
Ernest Fehr and
Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of Incentives, Schumpeter Lecture,
Annual Conference of the European Economic Association 2001.
Examples, in addition to those cited in footnote 63 supra, are
George
A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q. J. of
Econ. 543 (1982);
Rachel E. Kranton, Reciprocal Exchange: A Self-Sustaining
System, 86 Am. Ec. Rev., 830 (1996);
Janet T. Landa, The Enigma of
the Kula Ring in Trust, ethnicity, and identity: beyond the new institutional
economics of ethnic trading networks, contract law, and gift-exchange
141-172 (1994);
Ernst Fehr, Erich Kirchler, Andreas Weichbold, & Simon
Gachter, When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in
Experimental Labor Markets, 16 J. Labor Econ. 324 (1998). My point
is narrower, that is, that the baseline response of most economists
and lawyers trained to look at questions through an economic prism
is disbelief, and my purpose in the analytic segment of this article
is to respond to that widely held disbelief.
mostly can be found at:
http://www.iew.unizh.ch/wp/